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FROM BLACKBEARD TO BIN LADEN: THE RE-
EMERGENCE OF THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
OF 1789 AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM
Thomas M Pohl
Son, my turn. I've been sitting here for ten minutes now looking over this rap sheet
of yours. I just can't believe it. June '93, assault. September '93, assault. Grand theft
auto, February '94, where apparently you defended yourself and had the case thrown
out by citing Free Property Rights of Horse and Carriage from 1798 ....
- Judge Malone, Good Will Hunting
I. INTRODUCTION
Moviegoers may remember this entertaining courtroom scene from the 1997 movie
"Good Will Hunting." The look on the judge's face is priceless when it becomes clear
to him that Matt Damon's character has a long and successful history of defending
himself in court by citing obscure, colonial era statutes and precedent. Of course, the
concept of a long forgotten statute from 1798 being dug up and successfully used in
court by a creative modem legal mind strikes most as pure Hollywood fantasy. Yet this
happened in real life when, in 1980, creative human rights lawyers resurrected a near
dormant 1789 statute originally intended to protect the victims of pirates on the high23
seas. Since then, the Alien Tort Claims Act of 17893 has been cited in dozens of
cases, 4 and its rapid-and often unpredictable-expansion has led to speculation
regarding the impact that the Act could have when applied to situations arising out of
the current global war on terrorism. 5
The Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, was passed by the nation's founders
* Thomas M. Pohl received his J.D. from Notre Dame Law School, cum laude, in 2008. He is a 2000
graduate of Princeton University. From 2000 to 2005 he served as an officer in the United States Marine
Corps, deploying twice, and he is currently a captain in the United States Marine Corps Reserve.
1. GOOD WILL HUNTING (Miramax Films 1997).
2. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
4. See Bill Baue, Win or Lose in Court: Alien Tort Claims Act Pushes Corporate Respect for Human
Rights, BUSINESS ETHics, Summer 2006, at 12.
5. The label attached to United States military actions since September 11, 2001 has been a topic of a
great deal of political debate, but this debate is outside the scope of this Note. For purposes of this Note, the
term "global war on terrorism" is used to encompass all post-9/1 I United States military actions in Iraq and
Afghanistan, as well as all post-9/l I United States military actions against al Qaeda and al Qaeda-affiliated
organizations worldwide. The term "global war on terrorism" was selected because this is how the United
States military refers to this collective body of actions.
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during the First Congress in 1789. 6 (The Act is sometimes also referred to as the
"Alien Tort Act" or the "Alien Tort Statute.") The Act states, in relevant part: "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
7
Though somewhat debatable, it is thought that originally the Act was meant to
provide a civil tort remedy in United States federal courts for alien merchants
victimized by pirates while trading with the fledgling United States. 8 However, once
passed the Act lay virtually dormant until 1980, 9 when it was invoked in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala by a Paraguayan torture victim. 0  Since 1980, the Act has been invoked
dozens of times, primarily in cases involving international human rights issues. I I
Though many of these cases have met with less-than-complete success or have become
bogged down in the appeals process, the sheer number of cases attempting to invoke
what was long thought to be a dormant statute has caused many legal scholars to
comment upon the "re-emergence" of the Act. 
12
As modem courts grapple with the Act's meaning, most of the debate has been
focused upon the overseas actions of large corporations and the extent to which these
corporations could be held liable in United States federal courts for torts committed
overseas.13 However, there is also some debate as to whether, and to what extent, the
United States government and members of the United States military could be sued
under the Act by foreign nationals for events taking place in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
elsewhere abroad. 14  Such concerns also (and perhaps more promisingly) extend to
various civilian contractors and other companies and individuals who work for or
cooperate with the United States in overseas anti-terrorism efforts. 15
The bottom line seems to be that, after two centuries of obscurity, the Alien Tort
Claims Act has been resurrected, but no one seems to be able to predict what impact
modem use of the Act will have with any degree of certainty. At one point, the Bush
administration argued that the Act should be modified or abolished. 16 Various legal
commentators have classified it as everything from a powerful human rights tool to a
6. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
8. See Baue, supra note 4; Leon Gettler, Liability Forges a New Morality, THE AGE (Australia), Aug. 3,
2005, at 12, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intjustice/atca/2005/0803morality.htm.
9. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE OF 1789 3 (Institute for International Economics 2003).
10. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980). The Court in Filartiga identified only two
cases in the preceding 191 years which addressed the Act. See id. at 887-88.
11. See Baue, supra note 4.
12. See Rachel Chambers, The Unocal Settlement: Implications for the Developing Law on Corporate
Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 13 No. I HUM. RTS. BRIEF 14 (2005); Anne-Marie Slaughter & David L.
Bosco, Alternative Justice, Global Policy Forum, http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/atca/2001/altjust.htm
(last visited Mar. 25, 2007); see generally HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 9.
13. See Baue, supra note 4.
14. See Charlie Savage, Four Ex-Detainees Sue Rumsfeld, Ten Others: Plaintiffs Allege Officials to
Blame for Abuse at Base, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 28, 2004, at A2; see also Warren Richey, When Can
Foreigners Sue In US Courts?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 30, 2004, at 2.
15. See Savage, supra note 14; see also Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 55, 56 (D.D.C. 2006).
16. Richard Hermer & Martyn Day, Helping Bush Bushwhack Justice, THE GUARDIAN (London), Apr.
27, 2004, at 16.
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meaningless jurisdictional provision. 17  The Supreme Court issued a 2004 holding
involving the Act which provided less clarification than many would have liked
regarding the overall application of the Act. 18 The goal of this Note is to explore how
the Act has been employed and interpreted to date, to examine the various predictions
regarding the Act's future use and, in particular, its potential impact on the global war
on terrorism.
II. HISTORY
A. Origin of the Act and Subsequent Dormancy
The Alien Tort Claims Act was passed in 1789 by the United States' First
Congress. 19 The Act states, in relevant part: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
' 20
Scholars know surprisingly little about the origins of the Act.2 1 This is quite
understandable when one considers that the First Congress had the monumental task of
drafting and passing the infant nation's first legislation, most of which was far more
important than an act addressing civil tort liability.
The leading theory surrounding the origins of the Act is that it was drafted as a
response to two specific concerns, and that-together-these two concerns spawned a
perceived need for a broader expression of the United States' desire to be a "nation of
laws."
, 22
The first concern addressed by the Act is piracy, as suggested by the title of this
article. 23  After gaining independence from Britain, the founding fathers knew that
maintaining and encouraging trade of American goods with European merchants would
be a major factor in the creation of a strong economy. 24 With this in mind, the Act was
part of a larger effort to extend the protections of United States courts to foreign
merchants and sea captains willing to trade with the United States. While criminal
prosecution for acts of piracy was addressed elsewhere, the Alien Tort Claims Act was
intended to ensure that foreign traders victimized by pirates had access to federal courts
17. Anthony J. Sebok, Is the Alien Tort Claims Act a Powerful Human Rights Tool?, CNN.cOM, Jul. 12,
2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/07/1 2/sebok.alien.tort.claims/index.html.
18. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004); see also Sebok, supra note 17 ("[T]he court, in
deciding Sosa, avoided many of the hard questions that have made the ATCA so controversial ... It thus left
often the question of whether the ATCA will be as powerful a weapon as human rights activists hope - or as
weak a weapon as multinationals hope.").
19. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
21. See Warren Richey, Ruling Makes It Harder for Foreigners to Sue in U.S. Courts, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Jun. 30, 2004, at 3.
22. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715.
23. Admittedly, some artistic license has been taken with the title, as the buccaneer known as
"Blackbeard" had been dead for nearly ninety years at the time of the Act's creation. However, the type of
piracy that Blackbeard's name invokes in modem minds is essentially the sort of activity that the drafters of
the Act meant to address. Baue, supra note 4; Gettler, supra note 8.
24. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 9.
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so that they could pursue a civil tort remedy against their aggressors. 25 Of course, the
impracticality of the Act is obvious with respect to such situations-the Act may give
federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over alien tort claims, 26 but there is still the
problem of gaining personal jurisdiction over the pirate-defendants, 27 not to mention
the potential problems of enforcing judgments against these less-than-law-abiding
individuals.
28
The second concern addressed by the Act stemmed from the high-profile assault of
a French foreign ambassador on American soil. 29  By expressly making the federal
courts open to foreign tort victims (or to their estates), the founding fathers sought to
send a message to visiting merchants, diplomats, and visitors and the new United States
would be a nation of laws--essentially the same message that the founding fathers
sought to send to merchants and sea captains with respect to piracy.
30
This broad expression that the United States is a "nation of laws" is, perhaps, the
real purpose of the Act. As the impracticality of actually applying the Act to instances
of piracy suggests, the Act may have originally been intended to be more of a political
message than a functioning, commonly used statute. 3 1 The terms of the Act, rooted in
"the law of nations" and in treaties of the United States, signaled that United States
courts would be amenable to actions and grievances of the sort recognized by the
"civilized" European community of which they sought to be a part.
32
There is one notable case from the Act's early history 33 that serves to illustrate the
United States' early desire to create and maintain a law-abiding reputation: the early
Alien Tort Claims Act case of Bolchos v. Darrel,34 decided by the Honorable Thomas
Bee of the District Court of South Carolina in 1795. Though the facts of the case are
somewhat odd and disturbing by modern standards, the true significance of this case is
the district court's willingness to hear this tort action via the Alien Tort Claims Act in
order to demonstrate to the foreign nationals involved that the United States is
respectful of treaties and of the laws of nations.
Captain Bolchos was a French sea captain who captured a Spanish merchant ship
on the high seas, sailing it into a South Carolina port. 35 The seizure of the ship itself
was not an issue in the case-a state of war existed between France and Spain at the
time, and so Captain Bolchos' action was presumed to have been a legal seizure of an
25. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715-16.
26. Id. at 729.
27. See Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 12 ("[T]he Supreme Court rejected the notion that a plaintiff
could bypass the protection of sovereign immunity and sue a foreign government or a sitting foreign leader
directly under the Alien Tort statue" and that "(t)he courts have also ruled that plaintiff can only sue
defendants who venture onto U.S. soil.").
28. See id. ("Most of the judgments that have been entered remain unpaid.").
29. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716-17 (describing "the so-called Marbois incident of May 1784").
30. Id. at 717.
31. See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 9, at 3 ("[T]he ATS was apparently intended to show
European powers that the new nation would not tolerate flagrant violations of the 'law of nations'").
32. Id.
33. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720 (referencing Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F.Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607)).
34. Bolchos, 3 F.Cas. at 810.
35. Id.
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enemy ship.36  The case arose because Bolchos sought to keep possession of the
captured Spanish cargo, while a citizen of Great Britain (a man named Savage, acting
through his agent, Darrel) claimed a right to some of the cargo because it had been
mortgaged to him. 37 The disturbing aspect was that the "cargo" in question was an
unspecified number of "negroes." 38 In other words, to put it bluntly: a Spanish slave
owner mortgaged his slaves to a British citizen in exchange for cash, the slaves were on
the ship when it was captured, and this South Carolina case was the French captain's
attempt to retain possession of the mortgaged "property."
The district court began by noting that this case had already been dismissed by a
South Carolina state court for lack of jurisdiction.39 The district court held that, unlike
the state court, the federal court had jurisdiction over the matter via the Alien Tort
Claims Act. 40 After making this jurisdictional note, the district court went on to hold
that the federal courts were obliged to give full recognition to "the treaty" between the
United States and France, the terms of which appeared to govern the mortgage issue
before the court.41 While the mortgage decision that the court proceeded to explain is
inconsequential to a discussion of the Alien Tort Claims Act,42 the larger issue is
significant-a federal district court afforded a French citizen and a British citizen their
day in court and based judgment upon a good faith interpretation of a controlling French
treaty.
It is possible that there were other early decisions similar to this one,43 but Bolchos
is the only one commonly referenced. The Bolchos case appears to have served the
early political purpose of the Act i.e. furthering the United States' reputation as a
modem, law-abiding nation by providing an available forum to alien litigants and by
affording due respect to governing treaties and laws of the day.44 However, after this
case, the Act lay virtually dormant. 45 It was barely referenced in any other materials
until the latter half of the twentieth century.
4 6
B. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala "Re-Awakens" the Act
In 1980, the case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala provided the big "Good Will Hunting"
moment where the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789 was pulled from the stacks, dusted
off, and used (on appeal to the Second Circuit) to successfully bring a Paraguayan tort
case before the Eastern District of New York.47 Though the Act had actually been
36. See generally Bolchos, 3 F.Cas. at 810.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Bolchos, 3 F.Cas. at 810.
40. Id. (referring to the Act as "the 9th section of the judiciary act of congress" and noting that the Act
grants the district court jurisdiction "where an alien sues for a tort, in violation of the law of nations, or a
treaty of the United States...").
41. Id. (citing the "14th article of the treaty" as support for this proposition).
42. Id. at 811.
43. See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712 (citing Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F.Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793)).
44. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
45. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 9.
46. Sebok, supra note 17.
47. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Sebok, supra note 17.
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invoked in an earlier (1961) child custody case, 48 and mentioned in a few others, 49
Filartiga is now generally recognized as the 'starting point' for the modem re-
emergence of the Alien Tort Claims Act.
50
Filartiga was a case in which all parties were citizens of Paraguay, and in which all
tortious events took place solely in Paraguay. 5 1 The plaintiffs were Dr. Joel Filartiga, a
Paraguayan physician, and his adult daughter Dolly Filartiga. 52 Dr. Filartiga, while
living in his native Paraguay, was an outspoken critic of Paraguayan President Alfredo
Stroessner's government. 53  Dr. Filartiga alleged that, on March 29, 1976, his
seventeen-year-old son, Joelito Filartiga, was kidnapped and tortured to death in
Asuncion, Paraguay by the government's Inspector General of Police, Americo
Norberto Pena-Irala (Pena).54 At the time, Dr. Filartiga attempted to initiate an action
in Paraguayan courts, but the Paraguayan government responded by arresting Dr.
Filartiga's attorney and "shackling him to a wall" at police headquarters. 55 Shortly
thereafter-and quite understandably-Dr. Filartiga and his daughter fled to the United
States and filed for political asylum. 56
In July of 1978, pressured by political rivals and enemies, Inspector General Pena
himself left Paraguay and entered the United States under a visitor's visa. 57 Pena
overstayed his visa, intending to permanently reside in Brooklyn, New York.
58
However, in 1979 Dolly Filartiga learned that Pena was in the United States.59 She
informed the Immigration and Naturalization Service, who arrested Pena and
subsequently ordered his deportation. While Pena was incarcerated at the Brooklyn
Navy Yard, awaiting deportation, the Filartigas caused him to be personally served with
a summons and a civil complaint. 61  The civil tort action alleged that Pena had
wrongfully caused Joelito Filartiga's death by torture.
62
When the case came before the federal district court, jurisdiction proved to be a hot
threshold issue.63 The court clearly had personal jurisdiction over Pena, since he was
personally served with process while physically within the state of New York.
64
However, the district court doubted that it had subject matter jurisdiction of the case.65
Seemingly grasping at straws, the Filartigas' original cause of action stated that the
48. Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 859 (D. Md. 1961).
49. See id. at 863.
50. See Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 12.
51. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 878-79.
59. Id. at 879.
60. Id.
61. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 879-80.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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case:
[Arose] under "wrongful death statutes; the U.N. Charter; the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights; the U.N. Declaration Against Torture; the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man; and other pertinent declarations, documents and
practices constituting the customary international law of human rights and the law of
nations," as well as 28 U.S.C. s 1350, Article II, sec. 2 and the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution, . . . 28 U.S.C. s 1331 and ... under the Alien Tort Statute, 28
U.S.C. s 1350.66
The district court considered and summarily rejected all bases for subject matter
jurisdiction and subsequently dismissed the action because of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.67
The Filartigas appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
68
Re-examining the Filartigas' laundry list of proposed bases for subject matter
69jurisdiction, the court seized upon the Alien Tort Claims Act and held that the Act
provided a legitimate basis for subject matter jurisdiction in the case. In the opening
paragraphs of his opinion, Circuit Judge Irving R. Kaufman wrote:
Construing this rarely-invoked provision, we hold that deliberate torture perpetrated
under color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the
international law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties. Thus,
wherever an alleged torturer is found and served with process by an alien within our
borders, [the Alien Tort Claims Act]7 provides federal jurisdiction. Accordingly,
we reverse the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint for want of
federal jurisdiction. 72
The Filartigas' case was reversed and remanded to the district court for trial on the
merits. 73 The Alien Tort Claims Act had successfully kept this improbable Paraguayan
tort case alive in United States courts.
74
Filartiga is seen as the beginning of the Act's modem re-emergence because of the
"Wow, it actually worked!" factor. Yet, it is also a landmark case with respect to the re-
emergence of the Act because it provides the first clues as to how modem courts are
likely to interpret and apply the Act.
One notable aspect of the decision is that the Second Circuit appeared to limit
66. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879.
67. Id. at 880.
68. Id. at 878.
69. Id. at 879.
70. Id. at 878.
71. The act is referred to in the Second Circuit's opinion by its alternate name, the "Alien Tort Statute."
72. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
73. Id.
74. The Filartigas were eventually awarded a $10 million judgment, but they were never able to collect
it; Pena lacked any significant assets, and he was deported immediately after the conclusion of the case. See
Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 12.
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application of the Act to instances where the defendant is served with process within the
borders of the court's jurisdiction. 75 In Filartiga itself, this did not present a problem
since Pena was physically present within the state of New York. 7 6  However, the
opinion's use of the phrase "is found and served with process by an alien within our
borders" appears limiting in nature, 77 making it unclear regarding whether the Act
somehow precludes the application of other bases for personal jurisdiction, such as in
cases where personal jurisdiction would be based upon satisfaction of "minimum
contacts."
' 78
A second notable aspect of the Filartiga decision was that the Second Circuit
rejected another motion that Pena made to dismiss based upon forum non conveniens 7 9
Pena argued that Paraguayan courts provided a more appropriate forum, and Pena's
Paraguayan counsel submitted an affidavit in support of this motion, "averr[ing] that
Paraguayan law provides a full and adequate civil remedy for the wrong alleged."
' 80
The Second Circuit found it irrelevant that Paraguayan courts were available to hear this
action-that fact had no bearing on the United States federal court system's ability or
willingness to hear the Filartiga case.
81
The most notable aspect of the Filartiga decision, however, was the exhaustive
analysis that the Second Circuit performed regarding what constituted a "law of
nations." The court began by noting that the Act, by its very terms, was limited only to
torts committed "in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
' 82
Classifying this as "a threshold question," 83 the court determined that there was no
applicable treaty between the United States and Paraguay covering the Filartigas' case,
so it began a detailed analysis of the phrase "law of nations." 84 In doing so, the court
examined numerous writings on international law from the United Nations and from
various legal scholars in an effort to determine whether the torts alleged in the
Filartigas' case could be classified as violations of "the law of nations." 85 The court
ultimately concluded:
In light of the universal condemnation of torture in numerous international
agreements, and the renunciation of torture as an instrument of official policy by
virtually all of the nations of the world (in principle if not in practice), we find that an
act of torture committed by a state official against one held in detention violates
75. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
76. Id. at 879.
77. Id. at 878.
78. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
79. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879-80.
80. Id. at 879.
81. See id. at 879-80.
82. Id. at 880 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)).
83. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
84. Id. at 880.
85. Id. at 880-85. For example, the court examined: The Statute of the International Court of Justice,
Arts. 38 & 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 160 (1945); The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 217(II)(A) (Dec. 10, 1948); The Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3452, 30 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975).
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established norms of the international law of human rights, and hence the law of
nations. 86
In holding that torture by a state official was a violation of the law of nations, the
court's extensive analysis and labeling of this as a "threshold issue" sent a clear signal
that the Act would not be liberally interpreted to apply to all torts, but only those torts
falling within the smaller sub-set of universally condemned violations of human
rights.
87
C. Expansion of the Act Since 1980
Since Filartiga, dozens of other cases have been filed which rely upon the Alien
Tort Claims Act for jurisdiction. 88  To date, the majority of these suits have been
initiated with the assistance of various human rights activists and non-profit
organizations. 89 For example, in recent years:
Philippine nationals sued the family of ex-dictator Ferdinand Marcos for acts of
torture carried out during his rule. An Ethiopian victim sued his torturer and won a
large judgment. A group of Guatemalan peasants successfully sued the country's
former defense minister, whom they accused of complicity in torture and extrajudicial
killings. Unable to get a hearing in Japan, a group of Chinese men forced into labor
during the Second World War recently filed suit in the U.S.
90
Many of these suits are at least moderately similar in character to Filartiga,
involving victims of torture, extrajudicial killing, and other clear human rights
violations. 9 1 This broad category of suits is also similar to Filartiga with respect to two
critical items. First, even though the Alien Tort Claims Act provides subject matter
jurisdiction, it can still be quite difficult for courts to get personal jurisdiction over the
defendants. 92  Second, as the Filartigas found out, it can be nearly impossible to
actually collect on any judgment rendered against the defendants in these cases.
93
However, a second broad category of suits under the Act has emerged in recent
years--one that has caused worry for some U.S. corporations and investors. 94 Alien
victims of foreign human rights abuses have begun to sue U.S. corporations for
86. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
87. Id.
88. See Baue, supra note 4.
89. See Sebok, supra note 17.
90. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 12.
91. Id.
92. Id. ("The courts have ... ruled that plaintiffs can only sue defendants who venture onto U.S. soil.
This requirement effectively immunizes many perpetrators, who know better than to tempt fate by visiting the
U.S.").
93. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 12 ("[P]laintiffs who win judgments [are not likely to] see the money.
Most of the judgments that have been entered remain unpaid.").
94. John E. Howard, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Is Our Litigation-Run-Amok Going Global?, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, Oct. 2002, http://www.uschamber.com/press/opeds/0210howardlitigation.htm.
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complicity in the alleged abuses. 95  Unlike the Filartiga line of cases, personal
jurisdiction and availability of funds, which are necessary to satisfy judgments, are
rarely a problem in cases where parties bring suit against U.S. corporations. 96
According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce web page, by late 2002 there were more
than twenty pending Alien Tort Claims Act suits specifically targeting United States
corporations, "alleging that U.S. firms doing business in... Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt,
Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Myanmar (Burma), Nigeria, Peru, Saudi Arabia, South
Africa, and the Sudan are liable for actions in those countries... whether or not they
had any direct connection other than being present in those countries."
97
A 2002 Ninth Circuit case, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., and the events surrounding that
case, provide a good illustration of the model used in the Alien Tort Claims Act cases
which seek to hold corporations liable for allegedly being complicit in human rights
violations. 98  In Unocal, Unocal Corporation was an energy company that was
constructing a gas pipeline stretching through rural Burma. 99  Unocal allegedly
contracted with the local government's military, seeking soldiers to protect the pipeline
while it was under construction. 100 In the lawsuit under the Alien Tort Claims Act,
Plaintiff "Doe" was actually a collection of Burmese villagers who lived in a rural
jungle settlement near the site of the pipeline construction. 101 The villagers' claims
included allegations that military guards forced them to work as slave laborers in
furtherance of the Unocal pipeline project, as well as allegations that they endured
rapes, torture, and other abuses at the hands of the Burmese soldiers. 102 The villagers
did not allege that Unocal Corporation directly participated in any of the abuses, but
instead alleged that Unocal should be held liable as an accomplice of the Burmese
soldiers. 103
Though Unocal prevailed before the district court, the court of appeals reversed the
lower court's entry of summary judgment and dismissal of the case. 104  Unocal
subsequently settled the lawsuit for an unspecified sum (rumored to be quite a sizeable
amount). 105  While the Unocal case was likely first initiated because Unocal was
available (a U.S. corporation) and because Unocal possessed deeper pockets than any
Burmese soldier could have, 106 the case also ended up illustrating another factor which
has led to the suit of so many corporations: the public relations factor. 107 Whether
95. Id.
96. Id. See also Thomas Niles, The Very Long Arm of American Law, USA ENGAGE, Nov. 5, 2002,
http://www.usaengage.org/news/2002/20021105_atcaniles.html.
97. Howard, supra note 94.
98. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2002).
99. Id. at 936.
100. Id. at 937-38.
101. Id. at 936.
102. Id. at 939.
103. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 942-43.
104. Id. at 962.
105. Lisa Girion, Unocal to Settle Rights Claims, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004. See also
Chambers, supra note 12, at 16.
106. Chambers, supra note 12, at 16.
107. Marc Lifsher, Unocal Settles Human Rights Lawsuit Over Alleged Abuses at Myanmar Pipeline, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005.
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Unocal Corporation was truly liable or not for the actions of the Burmese soldiers (and
it might have been), it is clear that-from a public relations standpoint-Unocal
Corporation wanted to avoid any protracted litigation in a United States federal court
involving such concepts as forced slave labor and the rape of villagers during the
construction of an oil pipeline. 108 Having the media pick up on sound bites from such a
protracted trial would have caused Unocal's stock to plummet and would have seriously
damaged the company's public image. 109
There have been a slew of similar cases in the wake of Unocal, in which victims of
human rights abuses (often assisted by various human rights agencies) have organized
and brought suits under the Alien Tort Claims Act against corporations for their
complicity in foreign abuses. 110 For example, DaimlerChrysler was sued in early 2004
"over its alleged role in the disappearance and torture of workers and union leaders"
based upon actions that the Argentine military took outside of its Buenos Aires plant
during the Argentine "Dirty War" of 1976-1977.111 The Coca-Cola Company was sued
under the Act by Colombian citizens claiming that the company influenced Colombian
military units which intimidated local unions. 112  ExxonMobil faced a similar suit
because of crimes committed by Indonesian army units assigned to protect the
company's facilities in Aceh, Indonesia.113
Just as Filartiga set the modem standard for use of the Act with respect to
individualized wrongs, 114 Unocal has set the modem standard for use of the Act to go
after corporate deep pockets via various accomplice theories. 115
III. CURRENT INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT: THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING IN SOSA
AND THE AFTERMATH
Given the explosion of cases which attempted to rely on the Alien Tort Claims Act
during the 1980s and '90s, it was probably only a matter of time before the Supreme
Court would find itself called upon to interpret the Act. And although the Supreme
Court's holdings always, by definition, provide the definitive interpretation of a federal
statute, the "re-emergence" of the Act from dormancy had set the stage in such a way
that any holding related to the Act would be afforded greater weight than normal. 116
This is because the Act is such a legal anomaly, having lain virtually un-cited for two
108. See Baue, supra note 4 ("The truth or falsity of the claims against Unocal was never established,
because the case never went to trial, but in the court of public opinion, Unocal suffered mightily by the steady
drumbeat of stories about the pending litigation.").
109. Even though Unocal avoided litigation, the corporation's stock fell $1.09 to $61.80 on the New York
Stock Exchange when the settlement was announced in March 2005. See Lifsher, supra note 107.
110. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEFEND THE ALIEN AND TORTS ACT (2003),
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/atca/.
11. Pablo Bachelet, DaimlerChrysler Sued Over Alleged Argentine Abuses, REUTERS, Jan. 14, 2004,
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/atca/2004/0114daimler.htm.
112. Id.
113. Gettler, supra note 8.
114. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
115. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
116. See Sebok, supra note 17 ("[H]uman rights groups and multinational corporations eagerly awaited
the decision."); Richey, supra note 21 ("[A]nalysts say any legal precedent established in the case could be a
watershed in the development and enforcement of international law.").
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centuries before exploding into widespread usage. 117 Even by the year 2000, there
were simply so few published opinions dealing with the Act that any interpretation or
clarification of the Act by our nation's high court would have a profound effect upon
any future usage of the Act.
The Supreme Court finally got to weigh in on the Alien Tort Claims Act in 2004.
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court addressed two issues: one dealing with an
exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, and the other dealing with the Alien Tort
Claims Act. 118 In a seventy-one-page opinion, the Court devoted roughly forty pages
to an in-depth discussion of the Alien Tort Claims Act. 
119
In Sosa, the plaintiff-respondent was a Mexican national named Humberto Alvarez-
Machain (hereinafter "Alvarez") who was attempting to use the Alien Tort Claims Act
to pursue civil damages in response to an allegedly improper arrest and detainment. 120
However, unlike the Paraguayan torture-murder victim in Filartiga 121 or the Burmese
villagers in Unocal, 122 Alvarez was not a particularly sympathetic figure. 123 By way of
explanation, the Court provided the following background information:
In 1985, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Enrique
Camarena-Salazar, was captured on assignment in Mexico and taken to a house in
Guadalajara, where he was tortured over the course of a 2-day interrogation, then
murdered. Based in part on eyewitness testimony, DEA officials in the United States
came to believe that respondent Humberto Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez), a Mexican
physician, was present at the house and acted to prolong the agent's life in order to
extend the interrogation and torture. 
124
Alvarez was indicted by a federal grand jury in 1990, but the Mexican Government
refused all requests to extradite him.125  Unwilling to give up, the DEA instead
"approved a plan to hire Mexican nationals to seize Alvarez and bring him to the United
States for trial." 126  Defendant-petitioner Jose Francisco Sosa and several other
Mexican nationals abducted Alvarez from his house, held him overnight in a motel, and
then brought him by private plane to El Paso, Texas, where he was arrested by United
States federal officers. 
127
Unfortunately for the DEA, Alvarez was acquitted in 1992.128 He returned to
117. See Supreme Court Asked To Stop Abuse ofAlien Tort Statute, INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Jan.
26, 2004, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/atca/2004/0126abuse.htm (requesting that the
United States Supreme Court clarify a "controversial 200 year-old US statute").
118. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,697 (2004).
119. Id. at 712-51 (referring to the Alien Tort Claims Act by it alternate name, the "Alien Tort Statute,"
throughout the opinion).
120. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697-98.
121. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
122. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
123. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 697-98.
126. Id. at 698.
127. Id.
128. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698.
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Mexico, and, in 1993, he filed the civil lawsuit which eventually led to this Supreme
Court case.129 Alvarez sued Sosa and several other Mexican nationals, as well as the
DEA agents involved, seeking damages "from the United States under the [Federal Tort
Claims Act], alleging false arrest, and from Sosa under the [Alien Tort Claims Act], for
a violation of the law of nations.' 130 With respect to the claim based upon the Alien
Tort Claims Act, the district court awarded summary judgment and $25,000 in damages
to Alvarez, and the Ninth Circuit then affirmed this judgment. 131
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral arguments on March 30,
2004-fourteen years after Alvarez's abduction.132 Then, on June 29, 2004, the Court
issued its decision: The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, unanimously holding
that the Alien Tort Claims Act should not have applied to this case.133
The media initially reacted as though this decision marked a defeat for champions
of human rights. The Christian Science Monitor wrote that "[t]he justices stopped short
of rolling back 24 years of legal decisions... [but t]he decision marks somewhat of a
setback for international human rights activists." 134  Even before the decision was
announced, some in the media had imparted a rather sensationalist slant upon this case.
One article in The Guardian, bearing the fair and balanced title "Helping Bush
Bushwhack Justice," proclaimed:
The [Alien Tort Claims Act] has been a truly remarkable tool for seeking justice for
victims of human rights abuses, empowering torture victims and the families of those
who have been killed to seek redress for crimes that would otherwise have gone
unpunished. It is astonishing and profoundly saddening that our own government
would spend its time and our money on seeking to support Bush and Ashcroft's
attempts to stifle justice for victims of gross human rights violations. 135
Of course, the Sosa decision was not a fatal blow to human rights everywhere. The
entire United States Supreme Court was in agreement that the Act should not have been
applied in Sosa. 
136
What the Supreme Court did do in Sosa was set forth an opinion that provides some
moderately useful clarifications as to how the Act should be interpreted in the twenty-
first century. To begin with, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Act is still a valid,
useable law. 137 The Court did not take the view that lower court cases expanding the
application of the statute had overstepped their bounds. 138  However, the Court
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 699.
132. Id. at 692.
133. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 699 (Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion, with Justice Scalia (joined by the
Chief Justice and Justice Thomas), Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer separately concurring in the
judgment.).
134. Richey, supra note 21.
135. Hermer & Day, supra note 16.
136. For example, it's a pretty safe bet that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg did not see her concurring
decision as gleefully helping President Bush and Mr. Ashcroft "bushwhack justice."
137. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.
138. Id. at 724-25.
2008]
Journal of Legislation
appeared to take the view that the Act should not be stretched any further than it already
has been. 1
39
Most important to the ruling was the observation that the Act is purely
jurisdictional in nature. 140 It provides a means of creating subject matter jurisdiction,
but the Act does not itself create a cause of action. 14 1 There is no such thing as an
"Alien Tort." In other words, causes of action must still be based upon existing treaties
or upon the existing "law of nations."' 142 This, in fact, was the dispositive point in Sosa.
The court held that Alvarez's improper arrest, though inappropriate and offensive, did
not rise to the serious level of a violation of the "law of nations."' 143 Instead, there is
now a general consensus among legal analysts that acceptable causes of action under
the Act may be limited to government-sponsored torture, genocide, and other "human
rights" issues. These issues are seen to exist in a realm of global concern that extends
these offenses beyond basic criminal actions (such as ordinary murder or rape) which,
while still serious, are perhaps best dealt with by courts in the jurisdictions where the
offenses occurred. 1
44
Other limitations on usage of the Act have been solidified as well, both through the
Sosa decision and in the cases that have followed. Courts have generally continued to
abide by the rule followed in Filartiga, where plaintiffs can only sue defendants who
are physically present in the court's jurisdiction when process is served upon them. 145
As one commentator noted, "[t]his requirement effectively immunizes many
perpetrators, who know better than to tempt fate by visiting the U.S." 146 Commentators
have also noted that many suits may be deterred by the practical consideration that,
even if a judgment is achieved, collecting that judgment from the defendant often
proves impossible. 1
47
Another very significant limitation on usage of the Act is that "courts have not
allowed Alien Tort claims to trump the legal immunity that is traditionally granted to
foreign states and their leaders." 148 This item is particularly significant when analyzing
possible suits that may stem from the global war on terrorism. Government lawyers
have taken the position that well-established immunity defenses would defeat any
attempts to sue the United States and those, such as government officials, who are
acting on behalf of the government. 149  Specifically addressing the detainees at
139. Id.
140. Id. at 729.
141. Id. at 724.
142. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (The plain text of the Act reads, in relevant
part, "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.").
143. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738 ("It is enough to hold that a single illegal detention of less that a day, followed
by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary
international law so well defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy.").
144. See Richey, supra note 21 (quoting Harold Koh, Dean of Yale Law School: "it looks like you can
still bring an action for torture, genocide, for slavery, for apartheid ... .
145. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
146. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 12.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Savage, supra note 14.
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Guantanamo Bay, a Pentagon spokesman states that, "[t]here is no basis in U.S. law to
pay claims to those captured and detained as a result of combat activity."150 Lawyers
working on behalf of the detainees, on the other hand, say that they will attempt to
defeat immunity defenses by asserting that "because it is illegal for any official to
authorize torture," immunity defenses should not apply if it can be shown that the
activities in question constituted torture and overstepped the authority of the
government official who authorized or condoned those activities. 
15 1
At this point in time, the total number of cases providing guidance about how to
interpret the Act is still underwhelming. However, thanks in no small part to Sosa,
152
the general principles discussed above provide a better understanding of how the Act
will be interpreted by modem courts. 153 What is still not fully clear, however, is how
the Act will come into play in cases stemming from the global war on terrorism.
IV. POTENTIAL APPLICATION TO GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM CASES
Since the Alien Tort Claims Act re-emerged in the 1980s, human rights
organizations have continued to rely upon it in actions attempting to address
"traditional" human rights abuses in foreign nations, such as the ones addressed in
Filartiga154 and Unocal.155 However, since September 11, 2001, the global war on
terrorism has created other situations where persons have attempted to sue in United
States federal courts by invoking the Act. These global war on terrorism cases, both
present and future, can be grouped into two general categories. The first category
involves cases where the victims of terrorist activity attempt to use the Act in order to
sue the terrorists. In many ways, these types of cases are closely analogous to some of
the earlier human rights cases brought under the Act. The second category of global
war on terrorism cases is a bit different. This category involves cases where
individuals, including "enemy combatant" detainees, attempt to use the Act in order to
sue United States government officials, military contractors, and other similarly situated
parties. 156 While the first category of cases seems to be in keeping with the Act's
original aims of combating piracy, 157 one wonders if the founding fathers would
approve of the "stretching" of the Act to cover the second category of cases.
A. Potential Use of the Act by Victims of Terrorist Activity
The Alien Tort Claims Act has the potential to be a useful tool when invoked by
the victims of terrorist activity. To begin with, the use of the Act against modem-day
terrorists seems to be strongly analogous to the Act's origins as an anti-piracy device.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
153. See supra notes 137-151 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
156. If the first category of cases represents the "Blackbeard to Bin Laden" line of cases, then those
critical of our current president might think of the second category as the "Blackbeard to Bush" line of cases.
157. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
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Looking back to the time period when the Act was first passed, it is important to note
why such an act was necessary in order to address piracy. The answer is found by
looking at the nature of the pirate himself. Pirates generally did not consider
themselves to be citizens of a particular nation-they were rogue nomads, whose crimes
were likely to be committed on the high seas and in other far-flung locales. 158 Our
founding fathers felt compelled to craft an act which would allow the victims of piracy
to have their day in court, regardless of the rogue nature of the would-be defendant or
the unpredictable place of injury. 159
There are strong parallels when one considers modem-day terrorists. Consider
Osama bin Laden, for example: he is a rogue nomad who no longer considers himself to
be the citizen of a particular nation-he has roamed from Saudi Arabia to the Sudan to
Afghanistan and elsewhere-and his crimes have, likewise, been committed
globally. 16  Given the similarities between pirates of yesteryear and modem
terrorists, 161 the Act seems like the appropriate vehicle with which to seek civil
damages for injuries suffered at the hands of terrorists. 162
In addition, policy experts since September 11, 2001 have generally encouraged
civil lawsuits against terrorists because these suits supplement any criminal proceedings
with respect to redressing harm. 163 Though civil lawsuits using the Act are fraught
with the same problems witnessed in earlier human rights cases using the Act, such as
inability to collect most judgments, 164 they are valuable nonetheless as a means of
giving the victims of terrorism their day in court. Such actions provide the world with
yet another way to "go after" terrorists, even though a civil proceeding is admittedly a
far weaker tool than a criminal prosecution.
To date, there have not been many post-9/11 attempts by victims to sue terrorists
under the Act. However, there is at least one case tangentially related to the Global War
on Terror which is worth mentioning, as it serves as an important reminder of what the
Act can-and cannot--do.
Mwani v. Bin Laden came about in response to the August 7, 1998 bombing of the
United States embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. 165  A truck bomb killed more than 200
people, including twelve Americans, and wounded more than 4,000 others.166 Osama
bin Laden and al Qaeda subsequently claimed responsibility for the bombing. 167 The
plaintiffs in Mwani were all Kenyans, and consisted of victims of the bombing, relatives
158. Expert Sinks Pirate Myths, Stereotypes With Real History, PURDUE NEWS SERVICE, Jun. 28, 2006,
http://news.uns.purdue.edu/htm14ever/2006/060628.T-Lambert.pirates.html.
159. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
160. A Biography of Osama Bin Laden, Frontline: Hunting Bin Laden: Who Is Bin Laden?,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/whobio.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
161. Expert Sinks Pirate Myths, supra note 158.
162. At least, the appropriate vehicle for foreign plaintiffs-recall that the act can only be invoked by
foreign plaintiffs, and not by United States citizens.
163. See, e.g., Hermer & Day, supra note 16 ("[L]lawsuits by victims of terrorist acts can be extremely
helpful to the government in its effort to track down terrorists and their sources of funding.").
164. See supra notes 74 and 93 and accompanying text.
165. Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1,4-5 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
166. Id. at 4.
167. Id. at 12-13.
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of victims, and businesses harmed in the attack. 168  As the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals explained, "They sued defendants Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda for
orchestrating the bombing, and defendant Afghanistan for providing logistical support
to bin Laden and al Qaeda."' 16
9
The lower court had dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction, 170 but the court of
appeals reversed (in part). 171  The first point illustrated by Mwani stems from the
portion of the case where the lower court's action was upheld: the dismissal of all
claims against the nation of Afghanistan. 172  The court of appeals held that "[t]he
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 'provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction
over a foreign state in the courts of this country.' Under the FSIA, a foreign state is
immune from the jurisdiction of American courts unless the case falls within a statutory
exception."' 73  This serves as a practical reminder that the Alien Tort Claims Act is
purely jurisdictional in nature, 174 and that it does not trump any applicable immunities,
including immunity granted to foreign nations. 175 For this reason, it may be rare that
action could be taken against a foreign nation for terrorism by using the Act. 
176
The second point illustrated by Mwani stems from the portion of the case where the
appellate court dismissed all claims against Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. 177 The
court of appeals held that:
[T]he plaintiffs have sued under the Alien Tort Claims Act, which the Supreme Court
has held to supply both subject matter jurisdiction and a cause of action for a narrow
set of claims brought by aliens and involving violation of the law of nations. The
Mwani plaintiffs certainly have more than a colorable argument that their claims fall
within that narrow set. 178
This is an important reminder that the Act does not support causes of action for all
torts, but only for those that fall within the narrower sub-set considered to be violations
of "the law of nations." The holding in this particular case provides some evidence that
acts of terrorism are likely to be accepted by United States courts as falling within this
168. Id. at4.
169. Id.
170. Mwani, 417 F.3d at 5-6.
171. Id. at 17.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 145-15 (quoting Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993)).
174. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004).
175. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 12.
176. But see Vine v. Iraq, 459 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2006) (illustrating that immunity statutes typically
have certain exceptions). In that case, former "human shields" that were forced by Saddam Hussein to protect
Iraqi military installations during the 1990 Gulf War were able to sue the Republic of Iraq. The plaintiffs
were found to have been "hostages," which meant that they satisfied one of the established exceptions to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's general prohibition against suing foreign nations in United States courts.
177. Mwani, 417 F.3d at 17.
178. Id. at 14 (referencing Sosa, 542 U.S. 692). A key point in these cases, with respect to the Act, is the
courts' recognition that the Act only applies to violations of "the law of nations," and not to all torts in
general. One other aspect unique to Mwani, however, is that the court permitted personal jurisdiction over bin
Laden to be achieved via long-arm jurisdiction. It is not clear that all courts would have allowed this-many
seem to take the view that physical presence in the forum state is required.
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particularized sub-set of torts, thus allowing the Act to be invoked in terror cases. 179
The Mwani court provided their rationale by citing Sosa, noting that:
In Sosa, the Court determined that the First Congress understood the ATCA to
"recognize private causes of action for certain torts in violation of the law of nations,"
including "violation of safe conducts, infringement on the rights of ambassadors, and
piracy." It concluded that "courts should require any claim based on the present-day
law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized
world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of [those] 181h-
century paradigms." The plaintiffs' [claims against bin Laden] would appear to fall
well within those paradigms. 180
Thus, bin Laden and al Qaeda were sued via the Alien Tort Claims Act because
their terrorist embassy bombing was seen to be sufficiently heinous so as to qualify as a
violation of the "law of nations." 
18 1
Examining Mwani and earlier Alien Tort Claims Act cases, it is clear that the Act
has the potential to be a useful tool when invoked by the victims of terrorist activity.
But it is only a moderately useful one. The Act does allow foreign plaintiffs to sue
terrorists in the United States under certain circumstances, 182 and-in that respect-it
promotes justice and ensures that victims are able to get their day in court. 183 It further
appears that terrorist activities may be sufficiently heinous so as to fall within the small
sub-set of tort actions covered by the Act. 184 However, though the Act provides subject
matter jurisdiction for a federal court to hear the case, 185 there is still the problem of
gaining personal jurisdiction over the terrorist defendants, 186 as well as the practical
unlikelihood of being able to collect on any judgments. 187 These are practical problems
that have somewhat plagued the Act since its inception. 188
B. Potential Use of the Act Against United States Interests
Cases such as Mwani have indicated that the Alien Tort Claims Act may be an
available tool for victims of terrorism to use against those who committed the acts of
terror.189 But what about the people in this world who view the United States as a
terrorist aggressor of sorts? Will the Act allow them to pursue their claims in the courts
of the very nation that they seek to hold accountable? The answer, like so many legal
questions, is a resounding: "Maybe?"
179. Mwani, 417 F.3d at 14.
180. Id. at 14n.14.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 4.
183. See Hermer & Day, supra note 16.
184. Mwani, 417 F.3d at 14 n. 14. See also Richey, supra note 21.
185. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004).
186. See supra notes 145-146 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
189. Mwani, 417 F.3dat 14.
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There are two general situations related to the global war on terrorism where the
Act is most likely to be invoked against United States interests. The first is by those
detained at Guantanamo Bay, challenging the legality of their detention and their
treatment while detained. 190  The second is by persons in areas affected by U.S.
military actions, seeking to hold anyone working in cooperation with the U.S. military
accountable. 191
With respect to the first situation, many of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay have
filed habeas petitions and other actions challenging the legality of their detention. 192
Often, these actions include a laundry list of alleged violations based upon the Fifth
Amendment's due process protections, the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual
punishment prohibitions, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment of Punishment, and the Geneva Conventions. 193 Typically, the
Alien Tort Claims Act is added to these complaints as well. 194  One of the more
prominent Guantanamo cases, Rasul v. Bush, provides a good insight into how the Act
195
is invoked in these cases.
In Rasul, two Australian citizens and twelve Kuwaiti citizens challenged their
detention at Guantanamo Bay. 196  All of the plaintiffs were captured by the U.S.
military in early 2002 while they were in Afghanistan, allegedly fighting for the
Taliban. 197 In conjunction with their habeas petition, 198 they also invoked the Alien
Tort Claims Act, alleging that their detention "without being charged with any
wrongdoing" is a tort actionable under the Act. 199 When the case came before the
Supreme Court, the Court held that:
[N]othing ... in any of our [] cases categorically excludes aliens detained in military
custody outside the United States from the "privilege of litigation" in U.S. courts.
The courts of the United States have traditionally been open to nonresident aliens...
[The Alien Tort Claims Act] explicitly confers the privilege of suing for an actionable
"tort ... [sic] committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States" on aliens alone. The fact that petitioners in these cases are being held in
military custody is immaterial to the question of the District Court's jurisdiction over
their nonhabeas statutory claims. 
200
Notably, the Court declined to decide whether or not the plaintiffs' detention was
"an actionable tort" under the Act. It merely held that there was nothing to prevent
190. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484-85 (2004).
191. See, e.g., Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57-58 (D.D.C. 2006).
192. Savage, supra note 14.
193. Id.
194. Id. See also Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484-85.
195. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484-85.
196. Id. at 466.
197. Id. at 470-71.
198. Id. at 472.
199. Id. at 484.
200. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484-85.
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detainees from invoking the Act in order to satisfy federal subject matter jurisdiction. 201
When the Court's holding in Rasul is coupled with other recent legal developments
in the global war on terrorism, the stage is set for an interesting challenge which will
likely involve the Alien Tort Claims Act. In a 2006 Supreme Court case, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, the Court made the somewhat surprising decision that the Geneva
Conventions apply to members of al Qaeda, even though they are non-state actors whoS 202
are not (and cannot) become "high contracting parties" to the conventions. The
Court's reasoning is important: the Court held that the Geneva Conventions apply
because over the years the conventions have risen to become part of the common law of
nations.203 Elevating the conventions (or, at least, portions of the conventions) to the
status of "law of nations" suggests that, in future cases, the Court might view violations
of the Geneva Conventions as "an actionable tort" under the Alien Tort Claims Act.
Further complicating the matter is that, in the wake of Hamdan, Congress passed
the Military Commissions Act of 2006. 204 Congress took this action expressly for the
purpose of remedying items mentioned by the Court in Hamdan. This act purports to
establish acceptable detainee processing procedures at Guantanamo Bay, fully in
compliance with United States law and the law of nations. 205 The Supreme Court will
undoubtedly address further challenges to the Military Commissions Act of 2006, and it
is likely that these challenges will require the Court to more fully examine the issue of
what constitutes a violation of the "law of nations." Given the Supreme Court's holding
regarding the Alien Tort Claims Act in Rasul,206 a future challenge to the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (and any Guantanamo cases in the meantime) will likely
involve the Alien Tort Claims Act.
As noted earlier, the second situation where the Alien Tort Claims Act might be
invoked against United States interests is the use of the Act by persons in areas affected
by U.S. military actions, seeking to hold anyone working in cooperation with the U.S.
military accountable. 207 Because of immunity issues, such suits are most likely to take
the form of suits against corporations cooperating with the U.S. military-somewhat
along the lines of a Unocal suit.
208
A 2006 case, Saleh v. Titan Corporation, provides a good illustration of the form
that such cases might take. 209 In Saleh, the plaintiffs were Iraqi nationals 2 1 who
alleged that they endured "acts of torture and other mistreatment" while imprisoned in
Iraq at Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad. 2 11 Because suits against the military itself raise
barriers based upon various immunities and also upon political question and separation
201. Id. at 485.
202. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2794-95 (2006).
203. Id.
204. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948 (2006).
205. Id.
206. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484-85.
207. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 98-115 and accompanying text.
209. Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F. Supp.2d 55 (D.D.C. 2006).
210. Plaintiff Saleh himself was actually described as "an individual residing in Sweden and Dearborn,
Michigan." However, all other plaintiffs were residents of Iraq. Id. at 56.
211. Saleh, 436 F. Supp.2d at 56.
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of powers principles, the plaintiffs in Saleh instead targeted a private corporation.
Defendant Titan Corporation is a private company, operating in Iraq as a government
contractor. 213  Titan Corporation provides interpreters to U.S. military personnel,
including-relevant to this suit-to the military intelligence interrogators at Abu
Ghraib.
214
The court in Saleh determined that the alleged acts of torture were not actionable
under the Alien Tort Claims Act. In a disappointingly brief memorandum order, the
court reasoned that the type of "torture" that constitutes a violation of the law of nations
is government torture. 2 15 Any "torture" carried out by a private corporation is really
just assault and battery, 216 and such torts of this nature do not fall under the coverage of
the Act.
The court in Saleh correctly notes that the Act does not cover all torts-it only
covers those heinous enough to rise to the level of a violation of the law of nations (or
in violation of a treaty). 2 17  However, the holding seems to be at odds with the
accomplice liability theories that succeeded (or, at least, forced settlement) in Unocal
.. 218
and earlier cases involving corporations. Given this apparent inconsistency, it will
be interesting to see how the district courts apply the Act in future suits against
corporations operating in support of the global war on terrorism.
V. CONCLUSION
A scant thirty years ago, if a legal scholar had been asked about the Alien Tort
Claims Act of 1789 it's likely that the response would have dismissed the Act as a long
forgotten statute--one of those "technically still on the books," like a law against
driving one's buggy on Sundays. In the 1980s, Filartiga made the Act relevant
again. 2 19 Later, Unocal and Sosa further piqued curiosity as to how the Act might be
applied by creative lawyers in the future. 22  The jury is still out, so to speak, on how
the Act will influence global war on terrorism cases. However, as cases such as Rasul
and Saleh illustrate, 22 1 an understanding of what the Act can-and cannot-do will be
212. Id. at 57. See generally Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 12.
213. Saleh, 436 F. Supp.2d at 56-57.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 57.
217. Id. at 56-57; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004).
218. See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
219. Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876.
220. Doe !, 395 F.3d 932; Sosa, 542 U.S. 692.
221. Rasul 542 U.S. 466; Saleh , 436 F. Supp. 2d 55.
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critical as courts address cases stemming from a conflict that has defined the early years
of the twenty-first century.
Whatever else can be said about this intriguing piece of legislation, it is clear that
its relevance did not die with Blackbeard.
